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State Developments in Auto Insurance Reform:
A Critical Survey

Richard C. Leone* and David T. Beale**
The movement for reform of the automobile negligence insurance system has
gained strength in direct proportion to increasing premiums, court delays, and
policy cancellations. Unfocused public dissatisfaction with the consequences of
the tort, or fault, basis for accident compensation has led, in many states, to
interest in a common remedy: institution of a no-fault or basic protection
insurance system.
In the six months since Transportation Secretary John Volpe endorsed the
state-by-state approach to automobile insurance reform, four states -Oregon,
Delaware, Illinois, and Florida-have joined early convert Massachusetts in
enacting "modified no-fault plans." The four new statutes differ in scope and
detail, but their legislative histories and major provisions indicate that the nofault debate, which began in earnest a decade ago, has now changed significantly in focus and emphasis.
Opponents of no-fault insurance, principally the trial bar associations, have
long argued that the negligence claims system is based on immutable moral, if
not constitutional precepts. Today, however, preferring a series of limited state
no-fault plans to congressional action on a tough minimum standards measure,
such as the Hart-Magnuson Bill, lawyer lobbies are abandoning their traditional posture of unyielding resistance to all forms of no-fault protection. Instead, they are working to preserve major features of the present negligence
system within the framework of "modified no-fault programs."
The resulting legislation bears little resemblance to the original "unmodified" proposals-the Keeton-O'Connell plan of 1965; New York State's Stewart Proposal of 1970; or the one-and-a-half-year old Puerto Rico Law. Bills
pending today in a number of states are no-fault in name only. And in the four
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new no-fault states, close examination of the enactment suggests that no-fault
proponents, having won the war, may be well on their way to losing the peace.
Oregon
The Oregon no-fault plan' will take effect January I, 1972. It requires all motor
vehicle insurers doing business in the state to provide each insured party with
auto-accident hospital, medical, and disability benefits on a no-fault basis up
to the following limits: $3,000 per person for hospital and medical; 70 percent
of lost income commencing 14 days after the accident; reasonable expenses
incurred in providing essential services which an injured party would ordinarily
perform. Benefits for hospital and medical expenses may be further limited: (a)
if the insured elects a deductible policy up to $250, (b) if the insured is "provided
for under another motor vehicle liability policy" or under the workmen's compensation laws, or (c) if the injured person intentionally caused the accident or
was engaged in a "racing or speed contest."
Beneath this new, first-party compensation provision, the old negligence
claims system, with all its attendant waste and inefficiency, is alive and kicking.
The new law does not restrict a claimant's ability to sue for damages; it does
not contain a single word on the critical subject of "pain and suffering" and it
is entirely silent on the matter of premium rates.
The essence of the original no-fault proposals was the abolition of the lawsuit
as a means of recovering accident losses -with the savings in court costs and
legal fees being passed on to the policy holders as lower premiums and expanded
benefits. In Oregon, the injured driver will choose between several possible
routes for compensation, any one of which may result in costly legal action.
In the simplest case, he may file a claim against his own insurer for benefits
within the no-fault limits. The insurer may then, if it considers the injury was
a result of another driver's negligence, demand reimbursement from that
driver's insurer, with disputes as to liability and damages decided by arbitration. Even in this straightforward case where the claimant is willing to make
do with reimbursement for actual damages within policy limits, the Oregon law
may still allow for litigation. By the terms of Section 8(4) of the new statute,
any claimant, if requested in writing by his insurer, "shall take such action as
may be necessary or appropriate to recover [the no-fault benefits already paid
by the insurer] from [the motorist 'legally responsible' for the injury]."
Further options are open to the claimant who wants to recover "general
damages" for "pain and suffering." He may file a claim with his own insurer
for actual damages under the no-fault levels and another with the responsible
I.

ORE. REV.
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party's insurer for general damages. Or he may combine both categories of
damage in a claim against the negligent party with recovery for actual damages
below the no-fault limits going to reimburse the first-party insurer. On the
subject of general damages, it bears noting that the Oregon Law unlike the
original no-fault plans does not require insurance companies to offer general
damages benefits on a no-fault basis. Thus the "pain and suffering" of automobile accident injuries will continue to be of that selective sort experienced only
by the non-negligent driver.
The Oregon claimant who avers actual damages above the no-fault level
must, of course, proceed on a negligence basis to recover the excess. So, for that
matter, may any claimant who wants to appeal to a jury for general damages -having first secured no-fault benefits for real losses.
Delaware
Governor Russell W. Peterson signed House Bill 270 into law on May 27, 1970
following unanimous passage by both sides of the legislature.2 The Act requires
auto insurers to provide, both $25,000 bodily injury liability coverage and
medical-hospital-income compensation, regardless of fault, at minimum levels
of $10,000 per person and $20,000 for all persons injured in one accident. These
limits may be varied by optional sublimits, deductibles and excess provisions
approved by the state Department of Insurance.
Delaware insurers must also offer $5,000-minimn.m coverage for damage to
property in or upon or otherwise damaged in an accident involving the insured
vehicle, and deductible collision insurance for damage to the vehicle itself.
Delaware's statute resembles Oregon's in a number of important respects:
claimants may still proceed against a negligent party for compensation for pain
and suffering; insurers who provide no-fault benefits inherit the beneficiary's
rights to compensation from a negligent party to the extent of the benefits
provided.
As with Oregon, the Delaware law makes no adjustment in premium rates.
Insurance Commissioner Short told newsmen that the savings in litigation costs
would not be sufficiently great to allow for a reduction in current rates but
might be enough to stave off future increases. "Without the plan, insurance
rates are likely to go up about 15 percent per year," Short said.
Illinois
The Illinois statute3 defines two categories of no-fault coverage-mandatory
2. DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 21, § 2118 (Supp. 1971).
3. I.. ANN. STAT. ch. 73, § 1065.150 (Smith-Hurd Supp. 1971) eff. Jan. I, 1972.
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first-party benefits and optional extended benefits. In the first category, every
auto insurer is required to provide hospital and medical compensation up to
$2,000 per person and income loss benefits, resulting from the "total disability" of the insured, up to $150 per week for 52 weeks. In the optional category,
each insured driver can elect further no-fault coverage for medical costs, income
continuation and survivors benefits "at a total limit of not less than $50,000
per person and $100,000 per accident."'
Illinois insurers may exclude benefits for drivers who were driving: (a) under
the influence of alcohol or narcotics; (b) with a suspended or revoked license;
(c) in a race; (d) in the commission of a felony; (e) in a vehicle known to be
stolen; or (f) with intent to cause injury to himself.
Like the other limited no-fault plans, the Illinois bill provides that insurance
companies paying benefits described in the bill inherit the beneficiary's rights
to sue an alleged wrongdoer for damages. Where Illinois parts company with
Oregon and Delaware is over the extent of that right to sue. The Illinois Act
directs that in counties where population exceeds 200,000, claims for auto
accident damages under $3,000 may not be prosecuted in the courtroom but
must be referred to binding arbitration before a panel of volunteer local attorneys. In smaller counties, the Illinois Supreme Court may provide for arbitration-presumably on the basis of trial case backlogs.
When a claimant does choose to file a negligence action, for either courtroom
or arbitration consideration, his prayer for pain and suffering damages may not
exceed 50 percent of the first $500 in medical expenses and 100 percent of
expenses over $500-except in cases of dismemberment, serious disfiguration
or permanent disability, where no limitations apply.5 In both these respectsthe out-of-court disposition of auto claims and the limitation on general
damages-the Illinois Act is closer to original no-fault proposals than either
Delaware or Oregon.
Florida
Closer still is the "Florida Automobile Reparations Reform Act" 6 of 1971.
That law, effective January 1, 1972, requires that every insured driver carry
$5,000 in first-party protection for medical-hospital-disability benefits. Benefits
may be excluded for an injured party who: (a) intentionally caused the injury;
4.
5.

Id.
AMERICAN INSURANCE ASSOCIATION, REPORT OF SPECIAL COMMITTEE TO STUDY AND

Ev-

ALUATE THE KEETON-O'CONNELL BASIC PROTECTION PLAN AND AUTOMOBILE ACCIDENT REPARA-

16 (1968). A 1968 nationwide study conducted by the American Insurance Association
reported that benefits paid for pain and suffering average over one and a half times those paid for
actual expenses.
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(b) is convicted of driving while under the influence of alcohol or narcotics; or
(c) was injured committing a felony. Policyholders may elect deductions in nofault benefits in the amount of either $250. $500. or $ 1,000.
Unlike the other limited no-fault statutes, the Florida law contains an explicit
limitation on the right to sue for damages. Insured Florida drivers will be
exempt from negligence liability in the case of claims below the no-fault limits.
As for pain and suffering damages, a claimant may maintain a negligence
action only if actual medical losses exceed $1.000 or if the injury involved
dismemberment, disfigurement, compound fracture, or "a fracture to a weightbearing bone."
The Florida law also limits use of the lawsuit to recover for damage to the
automobile itself. Every insurer is required to offer collision insurance coverage
for damage to the policyholder's automobile, regardless of fault. In moving
accidents involving parties who carry such insurance, each owner is exempted
from tort liability for damage to the other's automobile. Where an owner does
not have collision coverage, he may bring a negligence suit only if the damage
to his automobile exceeds $550.
Anticipating substantial savings from elimination of legal costs, the Florida
legislature ordered a 15 percent cut in rates for minimum-limits coverage.
Conclusion
Advocates of state-as opposed to Federal-action on auto insurance reform
argue that experimentation at the state level will lead eventually to a tested,
workable no-fault system. Opponents are skeptical of the ability of state legislatures, with so many members benefiting financially from the present negligence
system, to produce genuine no-fault reforms. Proponents of the first view may
take some satisfaction from the Illinois and Florida enactments, while skeptics
can justifiably cite the Delaware and Oregon laws as being little more than
statutory advanced-payment schemes.
In each case, the enacting state has proved itself unwilling to consider two of
the major defects which no-fault insurance was designed to correct. First, they
appear to have left intact the collateral source evidence rule as it applies to other
forms of private health insurance. Under the negligence claims system, an
estimated 16 percent of all benefits paid go to compensate losses already reimbursed from some collateral insurance source. Most of the early no-fault plans
called for elimination of this redundant-benefits system.
Second, the problem of the "catastrophe" claimant-the head-of-household
who is permanently disabled-has not been treated in a straightforward fash-
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ion. In each state, Bar Association lobbyists have successfully sold the notion
that only the negligence system can provide this claimant with the kind of
redress he deserves. It is difficult to reconcile this view with the negligence
system's past treatment of the catastrophe victim.
In the first place, it is precisely this category of claimant that the negligence
system is most consistently undercompensating. Empirical studies have estimated that three-fourths of automobile accident victims sustaining serious economic losses are receiving less than one-quarter of their losses back through the
fault system. 7 A 1969 study by the American Bar Association confirmed this
trend, saying, "The worse the case, in terms of loss, the greater the statistical
chance of receiving inadequate reparation." '
In the second place, whatever benefits do finally issue from the negligence
system, they are usually preceded by long delays, during which a claimant's
family may have no income support, and by the extraction of legal fees based
on a percentage, usually one-third, without trial work, of the total award.
Finally, for the dependents of the catastrophe claimant, who cannot prove
the negligence of another party to the accident, the negligence system does not
provide a single cent. So much for the fault system's compassionate treatment
of the seriously injured accident victim.
There are a variety of ways in which that victim can be equitably compensated within a no-fault system. He could collect benefits under an extended
coverage provision, either mandatory or optional, like the one in Illinois' statute. Or he could claim unlimited benefits for net economic loss under the system
proposed by the New York State Department of Insurance in the 1970 "Stewart Report." All these possibilities should be explored before a legislature
submits to the strange suggestion that no-fault benefits are a good idea for the
slightly injured driver but not for the seriously injured.
An encouraging development in this regard was the introduction of House
Bill 1365 in the Pennsylvania Legislature. Though it has not won the approval
of either legislative chamber, that bill is attracting national attention due chiefly
to the energy and high standing of its author, Pennsylvania Commissioner of
Insurance, Herbert K. Denenberg. Commissioner Denenberg, formerly Professor of Insurance at the Wharton School, was principal draftsman of the Puerto
Rico Plan.
The Denenberg proposal for Pennsylvania includes unlimited no-fault re7. A. CONRAD, J. MORGAN, R. PRATT, C. VOLTZ AND R. BOMBAUGH, AUTOMOBILE ACCIDENT
COSTS AND PAYMENTS: STUDIES IN THE ECONOMICS OF INJURY REPARATIONS 196 (1964).
8. AMERICAN BAR ASSOCIATION, REPORT OF THE SPECIAL COMMITTEE ON AUTOMOBILE ACCIDENT REPARATIONS

(1969).
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covery for actual medical, hospital and rehabilitative costs; with no-fault compensation for lost wages and services up to $36,000. Victims may sue for lost
income above that amount and for pain and suffering in cases of severe disfigurement, loss of limb, or permanent disability of 70 percent or more. The
Pennsylvania bill mandates a ten percent reduction in premiums with its sponsors predicting savings of up to 40 percent for some drivers.
The Denenberg plan is the most ambitious no-fault scheme yet espoused by
a state administration. As such, it represents a critical test for the policy of state
implementation. Of the state's 253 General Assembly members. 77 are lawyers
of whom 70 would suffer financially from enactment of the bill. The
Philadelphia Inquirer has said that legislative action on the bill raises "an
unprecedented potential conflict between public duty and private interest . ..
crystallizing the immense problems wrought by the fact that so many legislators
are practicing lawyers." The fate of the Denenberg bill will be watched closely
in the Congress and in other state capitals as an indication of the states' capacity to achieve genuine reform of the auto insurance system.

